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The Equality Taboo
David A. Strausst
INTRODUCTION
The constitutional law governing campaign finance is, to a
remarkable extent, the product of a case decided almost 40 years
ago. The case, of course, is Buckley v. Valeo.1 Buckley established
two principles that continue to dominate the law today. The first
is that, under the First Amendment, equality is not a legitimate
objective of laws regulating campaign finance. The only
legitimate objective is reducing the appearance or reality of
corruption.2 The second principle is a distinction between
contributions to a campaign and independent expenditures in
support of a candidate; regulation of the latter is much more
likely to be unconstitutional. 3
What's remarkable about Buckley's continued domination is
not that the case was decided so long ago. It is not particularly
uncommon for decades-old precedents to play such an important
role. Even among First Amendment cases, some storied
decisions that antedated Buckley continue to set the terms of
debate in their respective areas-New York Times v. Sullivan,4
limiting defamation actions against public officials, and New
York Times v. United States,5 the famous Pentagon Papers case,
Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law at The University of
Chicago Law School. I am grateful to the participants in The University of Chicago Legal
Forum symposium for their comments on an earlier version of this paper, and to the
Burton and Adrienne Glazov Faculty Fund at The University of Chicago Law School for
financial support.
1 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2 See id. at 25-27, 48-49.
Id. at 23 ("[A]lthough the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations both
implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose
significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and
association than do its limitations on financial contributions."). See id. at 19-23.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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which protected the right to publish government secrets.
Buckley's continuing influence is remarkable not for its longevity
but for two other reasons. One is that both campaign finance
and the regulatory landscape have changed dramatically since
1976, when Buckley was decided. Vastly more money is spent on
elections today than was spent then.6 Various vehicles for
spending money on elections-the campaigns themselves, of
course, and political parties, but also PACs and super PACs-
have been developed since then or are used in different ways
today. Congress and state legislatures have responded with
different kinds of regulation, although many of those laws have
been invalidated because of Buckley.7
The second reason that Buckley's continuing importance is
surprising is that, in a word, Buckley is no New York Times v.
Sullivan or Pentagon Papers case. Unlike those decisions,
Buckley was not built to last; its central principles rest on weak
foundations. Buckley's distinction between contributions and
expenditures, which has been criticized for many reasons, does
not bear the weight the Court put on it. More important, though,
the Court in Buckley dismissed the government's interest in
promoting equality much too quickly and unequivocally. In a
passage that has become famous, or perhaps notorious, the
Buckley Court said: "[T]he concept that government may restrict
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment."8 The interest in equality required a less
peremptory treatment than that.
The distinction between contributions and expenditures has
maintained its significance to this day, although there are many
signs that it is eroding.9 Meanwhile, Buckley's anathema on
6 Over $6 billion was spent on federal elections in 2012. See, e.g., The Money
Behind Elections, OPEN SECRETS, available at https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/,
archived at, http://perma.cc/CZ3W-HH37.
On the history of campaign finance regulation, see, e.g., ROBERT E. MUTCH,
BUYING THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2014).
424 U.S. at 48-49.
See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462-63 (2014)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Contributions and expenditures are simply
two sides of the same First Amendment coin, and our efforts to distinguish the two have
produced mere word games rather than any cognizable principle of constitutional law.");
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Pac, 528 U.S. 377, 407 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("Buckley, . . . by accepting half of what Congress did (limiting contributions) but
rejecting the other (limiting expenditures) created a misshapen system, one which
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equality as an objective has not only survived but is stronger
than ever. Because of Buckley, the consistent pattern for several
decades has been for defenders of laws regulating campaign
finance to insist that those regulations were concerned with
corruption even if those laws were, more or less obviously,
designed to bring about greater equality.10 Sometimes that effort
succeeded; usually it did not." Meanwhile, the opponents of
campaign finance regulation have increasingly narrowed the
definition of corruption in order to minimize the possibility that
regulations will be upheld.12
The problem with the Buckley Court's treatment of equality
is not that the Court had some concerns about allowing equality
to be an objective of campaign finance regulation. The Court was
justified in having some concerns. The problem is that Buckley
went beyond doubts about equality and treated equality as, in
principle, an illegitimate justification for restricting campaign-
related spending. The equality justification was not just
something that, for example, would have to overcome a
presumption of invalidity; it was "wholly foreign to the First
Amendment."13 But promoting equality is not, in principle, an
illegitimate reason for regulating expression. The opposite is
true: in principle, equality is a worthwhile aspiration for a
system of free expression.
The problem with equality as a justification for regulation
occurs not at the level of principle but at the level of practice and
implementation. What, exactly, would equality look like in the
domain of campaign finance? How would one bring about that
state of affairs? And, crucially, under what circumstances, if
any, could Congress or a state legislature be trusted to bring
distorts the meaning of speech.").
10 See generally RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS (forthcoming January
2016).
n Probably the clearest example is Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652 (1990), which upheld a restriction on campaign related expenditures by
corporations. Austin asserted that the restriction was concerned with "corruption," see id.
at 660, but defined corruption in a way that made it essentially equivalent to equality.
The Court said as much in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 350
(2010), and overruled Austin. 558 U.S. at 365.
12 See, e.g., id. at 360 ("Ingratiation and access ... are not corruption."); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 359-60 (2010); Fed. Election Comm'n v.
National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) ("The
hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.").
13 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49.
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about that state of affairs, assuming it could be adequately
specified? Those are important and difficult issues. But Buckley
did not treat the equality justification as raising important and
difficult issues; it treated it as a taboo. Peremptorily dismissing
equality as a justification, in the way that Buckley did, is not an
adequate way of dealing with the genuinely difficult issues that
that justification presents.
For Buckley to treat equality that way was a venial sin. One
of the great virtues of the common law-like evolution of
constitutional principles that is characteristic of our system is
that a case-by-case development can reveal that matters
initially thought to be simple are, in fact, more complex. Clear-
seeming rules become more qualified and complicated and,
often, better for it. But the trend since Buckley has had the
opposite effect. Rather than correcting Buckley's too-simple
treatment of equality, subsequent cases have made the problem
worse. Especially in recent years, the Court has continued to
treat equality as totally off-limits, while making sure that the
interest in combatting corruption will not be used as a means of
promoting equality. 14 The taboo against allowing equality to
play any role is the single most unfortunate feature of the
constitutional law governing campaign finance today.
In Part I, I will try to show why Buckley's treatment of
equality was too superficial. First I will discuss why equality is
in some ways a worthwhile aspiration-even a vital goal-for a
system of free expression. The easiest way to see the point is to
consider formal, structured discussions-debates, arguments in
court, and the like. In those settings, there is at least a
presumption that both sides get equal time and equal access to
the decisionmaker. A deviation from equality, if it were allowed
at all, would require a justification. Certainly a deviation that
resulted entirely from one side's greater financial resources
would, at least in general, be unacceptable.
On the other hand, there are serious problems in trying to
implement comparable notions of equality in unstructured, open
political debate in society. In that context, unlike a formal
debate, it is usually difficult even to identify the "sides" that we
would want to treat equally. Then if we could solve that
14 See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1440-42; Ariz. Free Enterprise Club's
Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 336-65;
Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
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problem, it would not be easy to determine what equality among
different speakers consisted of. But these are problems of
implementation; 'they are potentially very serious, but they do
not make equality any less of an aspiration in principle, and
they do not make the pursuit of equality through campaign
finance regulation "wholly foreign" to the First Amendment, as
Buckley says.
In Part II, I will consider whether political campaigns can
be assimilated to formal, structured debates-in which equality
is not just an acceptable goal but is relatively easy to implement
and presumptively imperative-or are instead, as Buckley
apparently assumed, more like open debate in society, in which
implementing a principle of equality presents serious problems
and even dangers. I will argue that political campaigns have
enough in common with structured debates to make it worth
trying to implement a principle of equality. This is especially
true because candidates and their supporters spend money
specifically in order to gain votes, and equality in voting is a
central constitutional principle. Significant difficulties remain,
but given the importance of equality as an aspiration, courts
should be willing to incur some costs and risks in allowing
legislatures to try different ways of promoting equality in
political campaigns. I will conclude by suggesting that courts
should discard Buckley's equality taboo and instead proceed in a
common law-like fashion to try to identify forms of equality-
promoting regulations that seem acceptable.
I. THE VIRTUES AND VICES OF EQUALITY
As is often the case with taboos, it's not that the taboo
against equality is completely irrational. There is something to
be said for it, possibly even a lot to be said for it. But there are
also good reasons for rejecting the taboo. And as is also often the
case with taboos, the biggest problem is that the taboo has
prevented the candid discussion of the pros and cons, and cut off
a process of trial-and-error experimentation that might have
captured some of the benefits and minimized the costs of
allowing the government to pursue equality in campaign
finance regulation.
509]1 513
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A. The Virtues: Equality in Structured Debates
The principal problem with the Court's treatment of
equality as a taboo is that equality is in some ways the opposite
of "wholly foreign to" a system of free expression. It is, to the
contrary, an ideal. Instinctively one would say that in a system
of free expression, all speakers should have an equal
opportunity to be heard: whether a point of view prevails should
depend entirely on its merits and should not be affected by
inequalities in the resources available to its proponents. The
central idea of a system of free expression is that a person's
ability to win converts should depend on the persuasiveness of
her speech. Speakers may be unequal in the sense that some
have better ideas, or are more persuasive, than others. But in all
other ways, they must be treated equally. Anything that gives
certain speakers an advantage, beyond the merits of their
speech, creates an unacceptable inequality and should
be rejected.
More concretely, in a formal (or even informal) debate, it is
natural, and intuitively fair, to divide the time equally between
or among the parties. A deviation from equal time requires a
justification. In oral argument before the Supreme Court itself
(as before many other courts and similar institutions), each side
gets an equal amount of time, and an advocate who wants to
keep speaking after her time is up will be told that she may not
do so because the other side must have equal time to speak. 15
That certainly looks like "restrict[ing] the speech of some . . . in
order to enhance the relative voice of others."
When campaign finance restrictions promote equality by
limiting the amount of money people can spend, the concern is
that people with more money will have an advantage. 16 That
seems like an especially reasonable equality-related concern.
Again, in an ordinary debate or discussion, one can imagine
reasons for allowing one side more time than another, consistent
with the principle that everyone should have an equal
opportunity to persuade. It might be better, or at least
acceptable, to allow more time to a side that has a more complex
15 See SUP. CT. R. 28.4.
16 See, e.g., Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and
Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160
(1994) (discussing the disproportionate influence of wealthy citizens in the fundraising
process).
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position to present, for example, or if one side were interrupted
more frequently by hecklers or questioners.
But it is hard to imagine a debate or discussion in which
time would be auctioned off in such a way that the amount of
time each speaker had depended on his or her ability to pay.
When a legislature restricts political campaign expenditures in
order to promote equality, it is trying to prevent the equivalent
of such an auction. It is trying to avoid a system in which the
side with more money can buy more advertising time on
television, for example-the analogue to winning an auction for
more time in a courtroom hearing or a public debate. Why
should that kind of aspiration to equality be rejected out of
hand, in the way that Buckley rejected it?
It is important to distinguish, in this connection, between
ability to pay and willingness to pay. Willingness to pay for an
opportunity to speak-assuming equal resources-reflects how
strongly a person holds the view she wants to advocate. It might
not be inconsistent with equality to allocate time on that basis.
Arguably a person who holds a view very strongly has a greater
legitimate interest in expressing that view, just because self-
expression is an important value, compared to someone whose
belief in the opposing view is only lukewarm. If that is so, then
treating people equally might require giving the person with the
intensely held view a greater opportunity to express that view.
Also, it is conceivable (although not obviously true) that the
intensity with which a view is held is a good indication of
whether the view is correct on the merits. But even if that is not
true, perhaps, in a democracy, respect for one's fellow citizens
requires that one pay more attention to views that they hold
intensely; if so, that would be an argument for allowing them
greater opportunities to express those views.
If resources were equal, then an auction would reflect
differences in willingness to pay, that is, in intensity. The quasi-
auction that campaign finance restrictions try to prevent, by
contrast, allows the opportunity to speak to vary with disparities
in resources, not just willingness to pay. It is not obvious why
preventing that kind of auction is "wholly foreign to the First
Amendment." The opposite seems more nearly true: allowing
speech to be allocated in that way seems inconsistent with the
principles of free expression.
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B. The Problems: Equality in Open Political Debate
In all of these ways, promoting equality seems to be at least
consistent with, and maybe even a necessary component of, a
sound system of free expression. That is enough to suggest that
the equality justification should have gotten more thorough
consideration in the Supreme Court's opinions. But at the same
time, it is not hard to see why the Buckley Court reacted with
such instinctive hostility to the idea that equality could justify
restrictions on expression. The examples I gave-formal debates
and courtroom proceedings-are highly structured events. It
seems completely unworkable, or worse, to try to extend the
norms of events like those to freewheeling debate over political
and social issues in society at large.
To begin with, in a courtroom or a debate, the two (or more)
sides are easily identified, and each speaker is associated with
one of them. When there is large-scale debate in society over
some issue of domestic or foreign policy, identifying the "sides"
in that way will be at least arbitrary and more likely impossible.
There will be gradations of opinion and qualifications in the
positions taken by various participants. People apparently on
the same general "side" of a debate about policy-for example,
whether a certain statute should be enacted-might disagree
about specifics, or in their willingness to compromise, or in the
priority they attach to achieving that policy objective compared
to others.
Even if one could, in an open debate in society about a
political issue, identify the competing positions and their
advocates in some way, that would only be the beginning of the
problems with promoting equality. It is inconceivable that we
would tell a person who wanted to write a blog post about a
political or social issue, for example, that she could not do so
because her side has already been heard from enough. For one
thing, a speaker in that situation would be entitled to assert
that she has a right to speak even if others have already spoken
for the same position. The idea that a person loses the right to
speak on a political or social issue because lots of others agree
with her, and have already spoken, certainly does seem "wholly
foreign to the First Amendment."
Even beyond that, though, what would it mean to say that
one side has been heard from enough? That is, what would
equality even consist of, in a society-wide discussion of political
[ 2015516
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issues? If certain positions are very unpopular, do their
proponents have to be given extra time, or extra resources, in
order to assure equality? Or, more implausible still, must some
of the proponents of the more popular position be silenced in
order to ensure equality? In a formal debate, or a courtroom,
both sides get equal time, irrespective of the merits, the number
of adherents, or anything like that. But when it comes to
debates about political or social policy, it is easy to think of
positions that are unpopular because they deserve to be
unpopular. Not many people these days will publicly advocate
racism or genocide. The idea that the speech of the opponents of
those deservedly unpopular positions can be restricted, in order
to ensure equality, is bizarre.
Of course some unpopular positions might be correct and
might in that sense "deserve" more advocates. But then there is
the problem that someone will have to make that judgment: is
this a deservedly unpopular position that should not have more
advocates, or a position that, while unpopular, should be given a
stronger defense? In certain settings-say, a conference of
scientists considering a disputed scientific issue-it is plausible,
or even a good idea, to have someone with the power to make a
decision like that: to rule out certain positions as obviously
wrong while soliciting stronger advocacy for positions that are
not getting as good a defense as they should get. But when we
are dealing with open debate in society about some political or
social issue, the only entity that can make that decision
authoritatively is the government. And for the government to
make those judgments-deciding how much is to be said in
support of a position on the basis of its assessment of the
correctness of that position-is directly contrary to the central
premise of a system of free expression, which is that the
government must follow, not dictate, decisions made by
free discussion.
II. EQUALITY IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
A. A Workable Conception of Equality?
Buckley's "wholly foreign" dictum assimilated political
campaigns to the second scenario I described-freewheeling
society-wide debate over political or social issues-rather than
to a more structured debate or hearing. That was an
509] 517
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understandable thing to do, particularly when Buckley was
decided. At that time, the law governing campaign finance had
undergone very substantial changes." The Court, and the
nation generally, did not have a lot of experience with campaign
finance regulation on that scale. In any event, a political
campaign looks less like a formal debate or hearing and more
like a society-wide free-for-all about a controversial political
issue. And allowing the government to promote equality in that
situation does seem highly questionable, even dangerous.
On the other hand, some of the characteristics of political
campaigns should have prompted the Court to consider more
seriously-if not in Buckley, then in later cases- the possibility
that equality is a legitimate objective of campaign finance
regulation. An election does have something in common with a
debate or a hearing. There are candidates, and voters will
choose one or another. In that way, it is possible-as it is in a
formal debate or in courtroom proceedings, even if it is often not
in a general political controversy-to identify the competing
positions with some clarity. One can say, for example-and
commentators routinely do say-that one side is much better
funded than the other.
Because the different positions can be easily identified in
campaigns as in highly structured proceedings, it is possible to
establish a plausible benchmark for what constitutes equality in
political campaigns-something that is not really possible in
open political debate. Just as the usual rule in formal debates
and courtroom proceedings is that each side gets equal time, one
can say that equality in political campaigns, to a first
approximation, is equal funding. Of course this is very far from
being the only plausible conception of equality; there are many
problems with it. But "equal time" in more structured
proceedings-which can also be criticized as reflecting an
unrealistic notion of equality-is an appealing approach because
it is a plausible account of equality and it is relatively easy to
implement. The same is true of equal funding.
One other characteristic of campaign finance should have
caused the Court to consider equality more seriously as a
" See, e.g., The Federal Election Laws: A Brief History, FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION, available at http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/L7RH-CDVX. The FEC commented about the 1970s: "In one decade,
Congress has fundamentally altered the regulation of Federal campaign finances." Id.
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justification for regulation. Campaign finance is ultimately
about voting, and equality in voting rights is a central theme in
the law.18 The distinctive feature of campaign finance-both
contributions to campaigns and independent expenditures in
support of campaigns-is that money is being spent in order to
win votes. It is generally a crime for a political campaign to
divert contributions into uses other than those related to
gathering votes,' 9 and a limit on independent spending is
directed precisely at expenditures that are aimed at getting
voters to vote for a certain candidate. 20 Of course it may not be
easy to distinguish between expenditures that are designed to
produce votes for a candidate and expenditures that are
designed to influence a broader public debate about political or
social issues. That is one among several legitimate concerns
about allowing equality as a justification for campaign finance
regulation. But assuming that the class of campaign-related
expenditures can be satisfactorily identified, those expenditures
are, in practice, an effort to translate money into votes. In
campaign finance, an inequality in funding is, other things
equal, an inequality in the ability to get votes. 2 1 People who give
more money to a campaign, or who spend more in support of a
campaign, are doing so precisely in order to deliver more votes to
that campaign.
There is nothing novel or "wholly foreign" to our system in
insisting on equality in voting. On the contrary: "one person, one
vote" is a foundational principle. The Supreme Court cases that
introduced that phrase were relatively late arrivals on the
'8 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) ("The concept of 'we the people'
under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those
who meet the basic qualifications."); Amber L. Cottle, Comment, Silent Citizens: United
States Territorial Residents and the Right to Vote in Presidential Elections, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 315 (1995) (discussing a trend in which the Court and Congress have
reinforced each other's efforts to achieve broader equality in voting rights).
19 See 2 U.S.C. §439(a).
20 See 2 U.S.C. §431(17)(a) ("The term 'independent expenditure' means an
expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate.").
21 See, e.g., Gary C. Jacobson, The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional
Elections, 72 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 469-491 (1978); Donald Philip
Green & Jonathan S. Krasno, Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the
Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections, 32 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE 884-907 (1988); Randall W. Partin, Assessing the Impact of Campaign
Spending in Governors'Races, 55 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 213-33 (2002); Alan
Gerber, Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Outcomes Using
Instrumental Variables, 92 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 401-411 (1998).
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constitutional scene: they were the decisions in the early 1960s
that declared unconstitutional the gross malapportionment of
state legislatures. 22 But the more general idea of political
equality has been around from the start, and the trend toward
political equality in U.S. history is unmistakable. 23 The
franchise has been expanded repeatedly since the founding: by
the abolition of property qualifications, 2 4 the prohibition of
discrimination against racial groups25 and women, 26 the
extension of voting to eighteen-year-olds, 27 and by the
reapportionment decisions. 28 In general, equality in voting
rights is not just an acceptable justification for government
action; it is mandatory. 29 The connection between campaign
finance and voting does not, of course, demonstrate that equality
is a legitimate objective of campaign finance regulation. The
problems that arise in assuring equality in political debates do
not disappear. But the tradition of political equality again
suggests that the Court should have taken more seriously the
argument that equality is a legitimate objective of campaign
finance regulation.
B. The Pitfalls
At least two problems remain: defining equality in the
context of campaign finance regulation, and, most important,
deciding whether Congress and state legislatures can be trusted
with the power of implementing some conception of equality. In
a formal debate or hearing, equality generally means giving both
sides equal time. But equality seems to be a hopelessly elusive
notion in open political debate. And it is certainly not easy to
22 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533, 554-61 (1964).
23 See generally the essays collected in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF VOTING AND VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA
(Donald Rogers, ed., 1992); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000).
24 See, e.g., KEYSSAR, supra note 23, at 24-27.
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
27 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
28 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
29 See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) ("[O]nce the class of voters is
chosen and their qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way by which equality
of voting power may be evaded.").
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define equality when it comes to political campaigns,
notwithstanding the resemblances between political campaigns
and formal debates or hearings. One could, to press the point
about the indefiniteness of the definition, enumerate various
sources of inequality that will always be present: some
candidates will be more charismatic, some campaigns will be
better organized, and so on. But these forms of inequality have
their counterpart in structured proceedings like debates and
hearings, and they do not trouble us there. So it seems
reasonable to set them aside in dealing with campaign finance
regulation, too.
I suggested earlier that equality of financial resources
provides at least a benchmark conception of equality for political
campaigns. But one could challenge this idea, too, in several
ways. Some candidates might attract more contributions, or
more money might be spent on their behalf, because people
believe in them more strongly. Why is that an impermissible
inequality? Or, one might say, why limit the demand for
equality to financial resources? Candidates' resources will differ
in other ways. Some candidates will benefit more from volunteer
labor and other in-kind contributions and expenditures, and one
might question why financial inequality is a greater problem
than inequality in access to in-kind resources. Some candidates
will get more endorsements or endorsements from more
influential figures; should that count as a kind of inequality?
Perhaps most important, incumbents ordinarily enjoy enormous
advantages. Is that an impermissible form of inequality?
Another deeper problem is that any conception of equality
will be implemented by a fallible and, quite possibly, self-
interested legislature. In an odd way, this both mitigates and
exacerbates problems caused by the indefiniteness of the
definition of equality in political campaigns. It mitigates that
problem because it means that the courts do not have to come up
with a definition of equality themselves. The question for the
courts is whether to uphold campaign finance regulations that
are enacted by a legislature as a means of promoting equality.
So, were the Court to reconsider Buckley's dictum about
inequality,30 the issue for the Court would not be whether it
could give a satisfactory account of what equality in campaign
3o See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
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finance consists of. Congress, or a state legislature, would adopt,
implicitly or explicitly, a conception of equality as the basis for a
regulation of campaign finance, and the Court would decide if
the legislature had acted in an acceptable way.
Consider, for example, the most common proposal for
promoting equality in campaign finance: a system of vouchers,
in which each citizen would be entitled to make contributions to
a campaign and expenditures on behalf of a candidate totaling a
certain fixed amount. But no one would be allowed to spend or
contribute more than that out of his or her own funds. There are
variations in the voucher systems that have been proposed, but
that description captures the essential features.31
This system reflects a plausible conception of equality. It
takes inequality in financial resources out of the picture, at least
if its restrictions can be enforced. It does allow citizens to
express the intensity of their preferences, to a degree; they do
not have to spend all of their vouchers, or they can divide them
among competing candidates. Except for the variations that
result from those differences in intensity, campaigns will be
funded equally.
One could criticize this kind of system on several grounds.
Notably, it does nothing about non-financial inequalities,
because it allows candidates to benefit from in-kind
contributions and expenditures. (In theory, perhaps, in-kind
contributions and expenditures-such as volunteer labor-could
count against the voucher limit. But that might be a difficult
rule to implement.) Most important, it does nothing to offset the
benefits of incumbency. Again, the system could, in theory, be
adjusted to try to offset the benefits that incumbents enjoy,
perhaps by setting lower voucher limits for incumbents. But it
would be hard to specify the magnitude of those limits in any
noncontroversial way.
The courts would not have to work out the specific design of
this system; legislatures would do so. But if the Buckley dictum
about equality stands, then any version of this system is at least
arguably unconstitutional. The restriction on cash donations
' For various proposals, see, e.g., Hasen, supra note 10; LAWRENCE LESSIG,
REPUBLIC, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS-AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 265-72
(2011); BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYERS, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 12-24 (2002); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A
Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1206-08 (1994).
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certainly restricts the speech of some in order to enhance the
relative voice of others. But why should this approach be
dismissed out of hand in that way?
Equality is, in principle, a worthwhile aspiration. That is
the lesson of the analogy to formal debates and courtroom
proceedings. It is also the lesson of "one person, one vote."3 2 In
fact, it is difficult to see what the argument against equality in
principle would be; the problems, as I've said, come at the level
of defining what equality would mean and then deciding what
institutions, if any, could be trusted to implement that notion of
equality. Beyond that, inequalities that are the result of
differences in ability to pay (as opposed to willingness) seem
especially unjustified, again in principle. In these ways, a
voucher system, although it raises some serious questions, is a
plausible attempt to achieve a worthwhile form of equality.
What all of this means is that when the courts have to
decide whether, say, a voucher scheme is constitutional, they
have to determine whether the risks are so great that the
legislature should not be allowed to try to make things more
equal. And there are risks. Any regulation of campaign finance
that limits independent expenditures has to distinguish between
money spent in support of a campaign and money spent in
support of a position on a political issue. 33 In a voucher system,
vouchers need not be used for the latter, even though speech on
a political issue might very well help persuade people to favor a
particular candidate. And, of course, people interested in
spending money will look for opportunities to evade restrictions
on campaign spending in just this way. But enforcing a
requirement that vouchers be used for spending that supports
campaigns may have the effect of spilling over and limiting
other forms of political speech.
Voucher systems also present risks that are common to any
regulation of campaign finance that is designed to promote
equality. For example, there is a risk that ignoring non-financial
resources will create a bias toward candidates from a certain
party or candidates who take certain positions. Perhaps, for
3' See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18; Gray, 372 U.S. at 384; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560-
61.
3 See, e.g., the definition of "electioneering communication" discussed in Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 321.
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example, labor unions,34 or politically-involved religious
groups,35 are important sources of volunteer campaign workers,
so candidates who favor their positions will have an advantage if
financial expenditures and contributions are limited but in-kind
aid is not. And, of course, there is a great risk that campaign
finance regulations will be a means of protecting incumbents. 36
The people who enacted those regulations were, by definition,
incumbents, and it would actually be surprising if they did not
try to protect themselves from electoral challenges to
some degree.
III. CONCLUSION
The Buckley dictum, and the Court's rigorous adherence to
it in more recent cases, treats these genuine issues as
insuperable obstacles to any measure that promotes equality.
That is a mistake. At the very least, the case for reaching such a
categorical conclusion has not been made. Once we accept
certain foundational principles-that equality is a worthwhile
objective; that inequalities that are the result of citizens' varying
resources are, in principle, unjustifiable; and that "one person,
one vote" means that equality in influencing voters in an
election is especially important-it is worth incurring some risks
and some costs to try to achieve political equality and avoid
unjustifiable inequalities.
Crucially, there are ways for courts to get a sense of how
great those risks and costs are. If, for example, incumbent
protection is the problem-and it seems to be the most troubling
problem-it should be possible to get some sense of whether a
particular restriction, like a voucher system, really does have
34 See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Unions to Have 128,000 Campaign Volunteers,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2012), available at http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/
11/01lIabor-unions-to-have-128000-campaign-volunteers/, archived at http://perma.cc/
24RB-DRLY.
3 See JOHN CLIFFORD GREEN, THE FAITH FACTOR: How RELIGION INFLUENCES
AMERICAN ELECTIONS 163-64 (2007) (looking at the 2004 election as compared to the
1952 election and concluding "Catholics and Evangelicals had become the major sources
of campaign volunteers" for Republicans).
36 See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First
Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1080 (1985)
("Research strongly suggests that anything that makes it harder to raise funds will be
detrimental to challengers and correspondingly strengthen the position of incumbents.
Contribution limitations, therefore, probably increasingly insulate incumbents from
changing political opinion in and strong challenges from their local constituencies.").
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the effect of making it much more difficult to displace an
incumbent. If states are allowed to experiment with different
kinds of campaign finance regulation, the courts can get
evidence from their experiences. If a particular form of
regulation has been in place for a while, there should be a
historical record that reveals its effects.
In these ways, the equality taboo can be, and should be,
replaced by the kind of frankly experimental approach that often
characterizes the common law. Maybe at the end of the day the
line-drawing issues will prove to be too great, and the risks of
incumbent protection and other problems are too substantial. In
that case, the experiment will have to be abandoned. But the
forty years of nearly rigid adherence to Buckley's dictum have
deprived the courts, and all of us, of the opportunity to see if
that is true. Taboos are not always bad, but they should be held
up to the light of logic and evidence before they are accepted.
That has not happened with the equality taboo in campaign
finance regulation.
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